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In individuals with chronic pain harmless bodily sensations can elicit anticipatory fear
of pain resulting in maladaptive responses such as taking pain medication. Here, we
aim to broaden the perspective taking into account recent evidence that suggests that
interoceptive perception is largely a construction of beliefs, which are based on past
experience and that are kept in check by the actual state of the body. Taking a Bayesian
perspective, we propose that individuals with chronic pain display a heightened
prediction of pain [prior probability p(pain)], which results in heightened pain perception
[posterior probability p(pain|sensation)] due to an assumed link between pain and a
harmless bodily sensation [p(sensation|pain)]. This pain perception emerges because
their mind infers pain as the most likely cause for the sensation. When confronted with
a mismatch between predicted pain and a (harmless bodily) sensation, individuals with
chronic pain try to minimize the mismatch most likely by active inference of pain or
alternatively by an attentional shift away from the sensation. The active inference results
in activities that produce a stronger sensation that will match with the prediction, allowing
subsequent perceptual inference of pain. Here, we depict heightened pain perception
in individuals with chronic pain by reformulating and extending the assumptions of
the interoceptive predictive coding model from a Bayesian perspective. The review
concludes with a research agenda and clinical considerations.
Keywords: interoception, interoceptive predictive coding, chronic pain, pain perception, Bayes theorem, active
inference
CASE EXAMPLE
Sarah, a 13 year-old girl has been suffering from visceral pain for over a year after she suffered from
severe acute abdominal inflammation. In addition, she has developed a profound fear and anxiety
of pain, especially in situations in which pain occurred in the past (e.g., in school). Furthermore,
whenever she becomes aware of visceral sensations, she immediately interrupts her activities. She
may then lie down or take pain medication1.
The girl in the case example suffers from chronic abdominal pain accompanied by fear and
anticipatory anxiety of pain. Importantly, she adopts protective responses in situations that might
not actually be painful, e.g., already when becoming aware of interoceptive (visceral) sensations.
Interoception is defined as sensing changes in physiological sensations from inside the body
1This is a generic case example, similar to previously reported ones.
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including among others pain, temperature, itch, muscular and
visceral sensations (Cameron, 2001; Craig, 2002; Tsay et al.,
2015).
One important question is why Sarah adopts these protective
but often maladaptive responses. One answer could be that Sara
learned to expect pain in similar situations and her behavior is
part of an anticipatory response (Vlaeyen and Linton, 2012). We
like to discuss a different explanation. From a Bayesian viewpoint,
it is possible and perhaps even inevitable that Sarah displays a
heightened perception of pain when confronted with harmless
interoceptive sensations. She then reacts to the perceived pain.
Our hypothesis is in line with the interoceptive predictive coding
model (Seth et al., 2011; Seth, 2013; Barrett and Simmons,
2015) and linked to the assumption of heightened interoceptive
predictions in anxiety-prone individuals (Paulus and Stein, 2006,
2010).
INTEROCEPTIVE PREDICTIVE CODING
While intuition suggests that sensations cause perception, recent
evidence suggests that the brain predicts sensory input, so as
to make inferences about the causes of the sensations (Dayan
et al., 1995; Rao and Ballard, 1999; Friston and Kiebel, 2009;
Paulus and Stein, 2010; Barrett and Simmons, 2015). What we
perceive therefore depends heavily upon the predictions of the
brain, which reflect what the system already knows about the
world and about the body. These predictions not only precede
sensations, they determine sensation (Hawkins and Blakeslee,
2004). Brains are thus conceived as prediction machines that
function according to the Bayesian interpretation of probability
that balance prior expectations against new sensory evidence
(Clark, 2013). The Bayesian perspective makes it furthermore
possible to develop computational simulations of predictive
coding strategies to reproduce and explain observed effects. Take
the example of Buchel et al. (2014), who estimate the level of
perceived pain of participants, taking into account their prior
knowledge and experiences in the context of placebo analgesia.
In this paper, we apply the Bayes theorem to account for
pain perception in situations where non-painful sensory input
emerges.
In Bayesian terms, pain perception is quantified as
the posterior probability of pain given the sensations,
p(pain|sensations):
p(pain|sensations) = p(sensations|pain) ∗ p(pain)/p(sensations)
(1)
where p(sensations) is the prior probability of the sensations.
The posterior p(pain|sensations) on the left hand side, and thus
the perception of pain, increases with the the pain prediction
[p(pain)], which may be conditional on past events.
The posterior depends also on the likelihood p(sensations|
pain). This likelihood might be heightened via (longer lasting)
learning processes or by “active inference” within a situation.
The former involves learning that the probability of perceiving
a sensation is high given pain, even for harmless sensations that
are not caused by pain. The latter describes a process with the
objective of actively generating sensations with an already high
likelihood p(sensations|pain).
Both active inference and learning follow from the free energy
principle, which posits that brains try to minimize sensory
prediction errors. This can be achieved by either learning correct
predictions, or by correcting mismatched sensory states by
changing sensory input through action (Friston, 2009; Edwards
et al., 2012). We will suggest that pain may be perceived in
situations where non-painful sensory input emerges, in part,
due to a pernicious failure of sensory attenuation such that
individuals actively solicit or attend to sensory cues that are
consistent with their predictions that they are in pain.
Interoception can be seen as resulting from this probabilistic,
knowledge-driven inference on the causes of sensory signals.
Interoceptive sensations are combined with prior probabilities
(predictions) of causes, estimated from past experience, to
create posterior probabilities that quantify beliefs about the
causes of such interoceptive sensations in the present. This
process is called interoceptive predictive coding (Seth, 2013;
Barrett and Simmons, 2015). Specifically, it is assumed that
there is an interoceptive system in the brain in which
agranular visceromotor cortices generate visceromotor as well
as viscerosensory predictions (Barrett and Simmons, 2015).
These sensory predictions, which are themselves based on prior
experiences and perceptions, function as hypotheses about the
state of the body that can be tested against sensory signals that
arrive in the brain.
If the pain prediction sufficiently anticipates the sensory input,
the perceptual inference can be made that the hypotheses about
the current state of the body are correct, i.e. the posterior
p(pain|sensations) increases. In case of a prediction error, i.e., a
discrepancy between the predicted and the sensory input, the
prediction error signals may be relayed back to the agranular
visceromotor cortices, where they serve to change the hypotheses
about the state of the body to fit the sensory input, i.e., decrease
the posterior p(pain|sensations) and by this the next prior p(pain).
This process is therefore also a perceptual inference. Alternatively,
the brain can initiate sensory states that are in line with the
prediction, in the sense that the sensory input fits with the
prediction (Seth, 2013; Farb et al., 2015). This process is the
already mentioned active inference. Third, the brain’s cognitive
control networks can change the focus of attention by biasing the
influence of incoming sensory input (attentional shift; Barrett and
Simmons, 2015), e.g., by reducing its precision (Edwards et al.,
2012).
WHY INDIVIDUALS WITH CHRONIC PAIN
PERCEIVE PAIN WHEN HARMLESS
SENSORY INPUT EMERGES:
HEIGHTENED PREDICTION AND
PERCEPTION OF PAIN IN THE MIND OF
INDIVIDUALS WITH CHRONIC PAIN
There is ample evidence that pain can be amplified through
expectations of intense pain and reduced through expectations
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of pain relief (Tracey, 2010). This influence of expectations
is usually assumed to be rooted in altered sensory processing
and expectancy-related modulations (Eippert et al., 2009). The
contribution of predictive coding and the specific role of
perceptual and active inferences in pain perception and more
specifically in chronic pain patients are to our knowledge less
discussed. As an exception, Wiech et al. (2014) investigated
the influence of altered perceptual decision-making (inference)
compared to the influence of altered sensory processing in a
probabilistic cueing paradigm. Individuals were confronted with
cues signaling varying probabilities for the application of a high
intensity versus low intensity stimulus. Results revealed that this
prior information biased perceptual-decision making. This is one
of the few studies which confirm that prior information can
change pain perception by impacting on perceptual decision-
making. In the following, we will elaborate on our assumption
that individuals with chronic pain perceive pain even when
confronted with harmless bodily sensations because the mind
infers pain as the most likely cause for the sensation.
We posit that in chronic pain patients, pain prediction
[p(pain)] is higher than in normal persons. Predictions or
expectancies have been discussed as a core feature of mental
disorders such as anxiety disorders (Paulus and Stein, 2006;
Grupe and Nitschke, 2013; Rief et al., 2015). The assumption
is that individuals with panic disorder display a heightened
prediction of aversive outcomes (‘If my heart beats, I will
die.’) which results in an exaggerated anticipatory response
to interoceptive stimuli - even those that are not predictive
of aversive states (Paulus and Stein, 2006; Farb et al., 2015).
Similarly, we assume that individuals with chronic pain display
a heightened and inaccurate pain prediction in situations
where interoceptive sensations emerge that have been previously
associated to pain. This will result in a conditioned fear response
even when the sensation is not painful (De Peuter et al., 2011;
Vlaeyen, 2015). Thus, a heightened prediction is not a novel
assumption per se. However, we broaden the perspective by
incorporating it in a Bayesian account of pain perception and
posit that it will additionally lead to a heightened and inaccurate
pain perception in the mind of individuals with chronic pain
when faced with harmless sensory input (Figure 1).
Take again the example of Sarah. One day, she might have an
exam at school and walks to the bus stop. She sees the bus arriving
and runs quickly. She perceives mild stitches and breathlessness
(sensory input). We assume that Sarah will display a heightened
pain prediction [p(pain)]. These heightened pain predictions may
have formed via associative learning processes (interoceptive fear
conditioning; Bouton et al., 2001; Vlaeyen and Linton, 2012;
Zaman et al., 2015), via biological processes such as structural
brain changes due to ongoing pain experiences (Erpelding et al.,
2014), via exposure to early infant pain experiences such as burn
injuries or neonatal nociceptive input resulting in exaggerated
expectations of pain in later life (Victoria and Murphy, 2015),
or via social influences, e.g., anxious parental reactions to the
child’s pain. Once Sarah has inferred and perceived pain, this
heightened pain predictions might also emerge as a result of the
perception itself as the posterior always becomes the prior for the
next perceptual inference.
We also assume that Sarah has learned that pain leads to
certain interoceptive sensations [likelihood p(sensations|pain)].
In the present situation, Sarah’s mind will therefore predict
incoming interoceptive sensations in line with this expected pain,
for example strong stomach grumbling, because she has learned
that pain is associated with strong stomach grumbling. This will
result in divergent observed body state (no stomach grumbling)
and predicted body state (strong stomach grumbling). Sarah
could now infer that the predicted pain is actually not happening
[low posterior p(pain|sensations)] and generate an alternative
causal explanation for the sensory input (breathlessness), e.g.,
“physical strain is the cause for the breathlessness.” This would
also lead to a diminished pain prediction in the next instance [low
prior p(pain)] as the posterior becomes the prior and therefore
reduce the divergence between the observed and predicted body
state.
We argue that Sarah will not be able to infer other causes than
pain for the incoming sensation. This might be due to individual
goals and preferences in persons with chronic pain. Sarah might
aim to regulate the “feared” interoceptive sensations rather than
to accurately perceive the sensation (Farb et al., 2015) because she
values a pain-free state more than people without chronic pain
would and thereby the pain treatment that allows her to reach
this state. Persons with chronic pain may also have a preference
to overpredict so that they have fewer undertreated pain episodes.
If Sarah pursues the goal to regulate interoceptive sensations,
she will engage in active inference by down-weighting discrepant
sensory information and generating confirmatory sensory input
in favor of restoring a previously expected state (i.e., pain). Sarah’s
brain will therefore more likely initiate visceromotor actions
that actively generate the expected sensation (active inference,
e.g., by rubbing or tensioning her stomach resulting in stronger
sensations). This will then lead to Sarah actually perceiving
pain as a result of the perceptual inference based on the new
interoceptive sensations. Sarah might then engage in regulatory
activities such as taking pain medication. Alternatively, Sarah
might engage in worrying about her expected pain as a method
to change her focus of attention (attentional shift). This worrying
might serve three functions (Eccleston and Crombez, 2007): it
might (a) activate alternative brain areas thereby decreasing the
focus on the interoceptive prediction (Paulus and Stein, 2010;
Seth, 2013; Barrett and Simmons, 2015), (b) serve to keep the
physiological arousal under control associated with the increased
anxiety as suggested by the avoidance model of worry (Borkovec
et al., 2004), and (c) maintain vigilance to the expected pain and
engagement to finding a solution (Eccleston and Crombez, 2007).
There are two core assumptions that we put forward: First,
individuals with chronic pain will display a generally heightened
pain prediction. Second and related to the first, they will generate
an increased posterior probability of pain via active inference
when harmless bodily sensations occur.
A large number of studies have addressed the question on
how beliefs (such as anticipation of pain) exerts impact on
what we perceive or see (for a critical review see Firestone and
Scholl, 2015). Brown et al. (2014) recently showed augmented
anticipation-induced potentials in patients with fibromyalgia to
laser heat stimulation compared to patients with osteoarthritis
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FIGURE 1 | The path from heightened prediction to perception of pain in the mind of Sarah, a 13-year old girl suffering from chronic abdominal pain.
and pain-free individuals, suggesting heightened pain predictions
in situations where pain is anticipated. Heathcote et al. (2016)
found that adolescents who catastrophized about pain were
more likely to endorse negative interpretations of ambiguous
situations, which we interpret as a consequence of their
heightened pain prior expectations. Whether individuals with
chronic pain display a continuous heightened pain prediction
across various situations warrants further investigation. The
assumption of a heightened pain prediction has been recently
discussed from a fear learning perspective (Zaman et al., 2015).
Zaman et al. (2015) provides a review of experimental and
clinical studies providing evidence for a transition of non-
painful to painful sensations after aversive conditioning (e.g.,
Wiech et al., 2010). Fear learning is assumed to account for
this transition. Specifically, bodily sensations become through
repeated associations with painful events predictive of pain
and aversive themselves. This will foster predictions of pain.
We suggest that these heightened pain predictions (Seth, 2013;
Barrett and Simmons, 2015) will bias the perceptual process
toward pain, resulting in an increased posterior probability of
pain in the near future and thereby reinforcing the learned CS-US
associations.
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The reasoning behind the second assumption, i.e., that
individuals with chronic pain will generate an increased posterior
probability of pain via active inference when harmless bodily
sensations occur, is that we sample the world to ensure our
predictions become a self-fulfilling prophecy and surprises are
avoided (Friston, 2009). Evidence for this second assumption
is still scarce. Regarding active inference, Buchel et al. (2014)
recently put forward the idea that in the context of placebo
hypoalgesia, the ascending and descending pain system resembles
a recurrent system that allows for the implementation of
predictive coding. Specifically, they suggest that the brain is
not passively waiting for nociceptive stimuli to impinge on it
but is actively making inferences based on prior experience
and expectations. The authors provide a review of findings
in the context of acute pain. Tabor et al. (2015) provided
evidence for the impact of predictions of the brain on perception
of painful stimuli. Specifically, they could show that when
people anticipate pain they underestimate the distance of
the threat (painful) stimulus compared to a relief stimulus
suggesting that pain-evoking stimuli are perceived as closer to the
body.
RESEARCH AGENDA
The general hypothesis that individuals with chronic pain show
heightened pain perception when confronted with harmless
sensory input because of predictive coding process is new and will
need to be elaborated and extended in future studies. There are
several questions that warrant addressing: First, the hypothesis
that individuals with chronic pain generate heightened pain
predictions needs to be tested. Therefore, individuals with
chronic pain should be investigated in various situations, e.g.,
during stressful situations or during situations that evoke
sensations proximal to the main pain region. One way to
study the assumption is to assess interoceptive accuracy across
different levels of arousal, and across stressful situations. This
has been successfully done in individuals with anorexia nervosa
(Khalsa et al., 2015). They found that during meal anticipation
individuals with anorexia nervosa experienced abnormal intense
interoceptive sensations, although a low arousal level was
induced indicating that prediction signals are abnormal at low
arousal levels, especially during meal anticipation. Another
way would be to develop a vignette-based task similar to
Heathcote et al. (2016) to measure not only the posterior
interpretation of ambiguous situations but also prior pain
predictions.
Second, the exact mechanisms and conditions that lead from
a heightened pain prediction to a heightened pain perception
warrant further investigation. In the current paper, we restricted
ourselves to a computational analysis of the process. The
next step is to implement the model on an algorithmic level
and to investigate how, assuming that perceptual inference
works like Bayesian updating, this process is influenced by
the patients’ likelihoods, i.e., their beliefs about the causal
relationship between certain harmless bodily sensation and pain
[p(sensations|pain)] as well as their beliefs about alternative
causes for the sensations [p(sensations|other causes)]. This could
be studied by explicitly querying the patient’s general causal
beliefs of pain and interoceptive sensations and comparing them
to beliefs of a healthy control group, or again by extending the
approach of Heathcote et al. (2016).
Third, the next step would then be the use of computational
simulations of the above-mentioned predictive coding strategies
to explain the observed effects in individuals with chronic pain.
Such models might also prove useful in predicting the expectable
effect sizes of treatments which could target either the prior or the
likelihood of pain.
In keeping with the general approach of computational
psychiatry (Fletcher and Frith, 2009; Pellicano and Burr, 2012;
Adams et al., 2013; Schwartenbeck and Friston, 2016), we thus
suggest to derive quantitative models, infer their priors from
human data in experimental paradigms and propose treatments
from our normative Bayesian theory of interoception, that can
then be tested experimentally.
Fourth, do these heightened pain predictions result in a
chronic physical burden such as a chronic metabolic imbalance
which is cused by constantly predicting the need for more
metabolic energy to respond to the predicted pain? This
imbalance might downregulate the HPA-axis resulting in chronic
hypercortisolemia (Barrett and Simmons, 2015), indicative of a
permanently altered stress response. Dysregulation of the HPA-
axis have been found in individuals with chronic pain (Fukudo,
2013; Shahidi et al., 2015) but have not yet been investigated in
the context of altered interoceptive predictions.
Finally, for an implementational level of active inference,
one would have to appeal to neurobiologically plausible process
theories for active inference (e.g., Friston, 2012; Barrett and
Simmons, 2015), which is, however, beyond the scope of the
current review.
CONCLUSION
In chronic pain research, interest is growing into interoceptive
processes, particularly into anticipatory anxiety of pain elicited
by previously neutral interoceptive sensations. Here, we argued
from a Bayesian perspective and formulate an application of
recent neurocognitive and neuropsychological models to account
for these maladaptive interoceptive processes in individuals with
chronic pain.
In our view, the application of these theoretical models will
broaden the present research and foster research into modeling
the aberrant interoceptive predictions in individuals with
chronic pain according to the Bayes theorem, into investigating
the cognitive, emotional and behavioral consequences of
the heightened pain predictions, and into the underlying
mechanisms. In the long run, this research may foster testing
the efficacy of interventions to modify the heightened pain
perceptions of the mind. To achieve this goal, interventions to
decrease the heightened pain prediction such as exposures to
maximize the mismatch between expectancies and outcome as
suggested by the expectancy violation model (Craske et al., 2011;
Rief et al., 2015), could be combined with interventions that
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enable the individuals to change their causal attributions (of pain)
for interoceptive sensations and reduce their active inference of
pain (Jensen et al., 2014; Farb et al., 2015).
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